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COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-FEDERAL IMMUNITY STATUTE-POWER OF FEDERAL
COURT TO COMPEL TESTIMONY DESPITE POSSIBLE SELF-INCRIMINATION.-

By a 7-2 decision, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of sub-section (c) of the Immunity Act of 1954.1 This law empowers a United States Attorney with the approval of the Attorney-General
to compel, by a District Court order, a witness before a federal grand jury
or court to testify or to produce evidence as to matters of national security
or defense in exchange for immunity from criminal prosecution, except for
perjury. 2
Petitioner was William Ludwig Ullmann, a former Treasury Department official who had been named by Elizabeth Bentley, a former Communist courier, as a member of a wartime espionage ring. Pursuant to a
subpoena, petitioner appeared before a federal grand jury in the Southern
District of New York which was investigating attempts to endanger the
national security by espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage. Invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, 3 petitioner refused to answer
questions concerning alleged participation in espionage activities and membership in the Communist Party by himself and others.
Thereupon, the United States Attorney duly applied for a District Court
order directing petitioner to testify and to produce evidence pursuant to
sub-section (c) of the Immunity Act of 1954.4 In an opposing affidavit,
petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act. However, after a hearing, District Judge Weinfeld sustained the constitutionality of the Act and
granted the application. 5 When petitioner again declined to answer the questions, he was adjudged in contempt and sentenced to six months imprisonment with the right to purge himself.
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second CirUnited States Supreme
cuit unanimously affirmed the conviction 6 and the
7
Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari.
On appeal the Supreme Court was presented with three basic questions. One, whether any "immunity act" which exchanges cbmpulsory testimony for security against criminal prosecution is repugnant to the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment? Two, if not, whether subsection (c) of the Immunity Act of 1954 violates the Fifth Amendment for
failure to afford as complete immunity as is co-extensive with the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination? Three, whether sub-section (c) of
the Immunity Act of 1954 empowers a District Court with the non-judicial
1 Ullmann v. United.States, 350 U. S. 422, 76 S. Ct. 497, 100 L. Ed. 361 (1956),
rehearing den. 351 U. S. 928, 76 S. Ct. 777, 100 L. Ed. 602 (1956).
2 Immunity Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 745, 18 U. S. C. (Supp. II) § 3486 (c) (1954).
3 U. S. CoNsT. amend. V.
4 See note 2, supra.
5 128 F. Supp. 617 (S. D. N. Y. 1955).
6 221 F. 2d 760 (2d Cir. 1955); See Decisions, 1. N. Y. L. F. 254 (1955).
7 349 U. S. 951, 75 S. Ct. 882, 99 L. Ed. 1276 (1955).
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function of reviewing a grant of immunity under the above Act and so contravenes the "separation of powers" principle of the Federal Constitution?
The first issue involved the celebrated case of Brown v. Walker.8 There,
defendant, a railroad company auditor, was subpoenaed to testify before a
federal grand jury investigating charges that company officers and agents
violated' the Interstate Commerce Act.9 Despite the immunity proffered by
the Compulsory-Testimony Act of 1893,10 Brown persisted in invoking his
privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions concerning the
operation and rebate policy of the railroad. He was thereupon adjudged in
contempt by the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and
the Circuit Court dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus." On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, upheld the
constitutionality of immunity statutes in general and the 1893 Act in particular as being within the self-incrimination clause. 12 It deemed the sole
object of this clause to fbe non-self-incrimination, not preventing personal
odium and disgrace. On the other hand, the dissenters in the Brown case
reasoned that the self-incrimination clause granted a right of silence that
"should not be divested or impaired by any act of Congress."'.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the instant majority, accepted the
Government's argument that the doctrine of the majority in Brown v.
Walker should be re-affirmed as settled constitutional law saying "Immunity
displaces the danger. Once the reason for the privilege ceases, the privilege
ceases."' 14 He observed that immunity acts are part of our constitutional
fabric and included in all major regulatory enactments of the Federal Government. 15 The majority rejected Ulimann's contention that the Fifth Amendment,16 including the self-incrimination clause, was created to buttress the
First Amendment 17 in its protection of freedom of speech.
As to the second question, whether the statutory provision in issue
afforded as complete immunity as is co-extensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, the majority held that it did. Passing over
the possibilities, alleged by petitioner of federal criminal prosecution for a
continuing crime' 8 and perjury,19 the majority concluded that Congress intended and possessed the constitutional power to grant immunity from state
criminal prosecution in the Immunity Act of 1954. That the statute did
grant such immunity, Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted, was evidenced by the
8 Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896).
9 24 STAT. 379, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1887).
10 27 STAT. 443, 49 U. S. C. § 46 (1893).

11 70 Fed. 46 (Cir. Ct. W. D. Pa. 1895).
12 See note 8, supra.
13 Id. at 610, 16 S. Ct. 644, 656, 40 L. Ed. 819, 826 (dissenting opinion).
14 See note 1, supra at 439, 76 S. Ct. 497, 507, 100 L. Ed. 361.
15 For a list
of such statuts, see 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE §--2281 n. 11 and Pocket
Supp. (3rd ed. Boston 1940).
16 See note 3, supra.
17 U. S. CoNsT. amend. I.
18 United States v. Smith, 206 F. 2d 905 (3rd Cir. 1953).
19 See note 2,supra at 18 U. S. C. (Supp. II) § 3486 (d).
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fact that identical language has been construed by the Supreme Court to
bar both the use of such compelled testimony in a state criminal proceeding"0 and state prosecution itself; 21 and that it was so interpreted in the
final report of the House Committee on the Judiciary. 22 The Court also
found that the removal of fear of state prosecution was within the constitutionally delegated powers of Congress to provide for the national defense2 3
and its complementary power of execution ("elastic clause") 24 so as to effect
a policy of complete and open disclosure. No distinction from Brown v.
Walker, where a similar restriction was upheld in the name of the Commerce
Clause,2 5 was seen. As for punitive disabilities, the majority rejected petitioner's claim that they must be regarded as sufficient grounds for invoking
the privilege against self-incrimination and should, therefore, be within the
scope of immunity. The Supreme Court had previously held that private
punitive disabilities26 were excluded from such protection.2 7 For the more
recent federal and state punitive disabilities 2s to be within the self-incrimination clause, they must first be deemed criminal in nature. As to whether
they are such, the Court left that question open until the time when a particular sanction is sought to be imposed. In so doing, the majority also
declined to accept, for the present, the Government's argument that all such
punitive sanctions are non-criminal in nature and thus provide no ground
for invoking the privilege, or even if deemed criminal in nature they are
necessarily under the aegis of the Immunity Act which covers "any penalty
or forfeiture" 29 arising from the compulsory testimony or production of
evidence.
On the final main issue presented, whether the statutory provision
which empowers a District Court with the non-judicial function of reviewing a grant of immunity under the Act contravened the "separation of
powers" principle of the federal Constitution, the majority held that it did
not. If adopted the Government's contentions that the statute clearly
20 Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179, 74 S. Ct. 442, 98 L. Ed. 609 (1954).

21 See note 8, supra at 607-8, 16 S. Ct. 644, 651, 40 L. Ed. 819, 824-5.
22 H. R. Rep. No. 2606, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1954).
23 U. S. CoxsT. art. I. § 8, cl. 1.
24 Id. at cl.18.

25 See note 21, supra.
26 These include: expulsion from labor unions; loss of employment; discrimination
in housing and public opprobrium. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 19, Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U. S.422 (1956).
27 See note 8, supra.
28 Federal disabilities include ineligibility for and loss of: a passport, employment
in government and defense facilities, and the risk of internment. Internal Security Act
of 1950, 64 STAT. 987, 1019, "50U. S. C. § 781, 811-26 (1950); a broadcasting station
license, F. C. C. Docket Nos. 11060-61, 19 F. R. 3588-89 (1954); use of N. L. R. B.
facilities, Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 STAT. 136, 146, 29 U. S. C. § 141,
159 (h) (1947); citizenship, Expatriation Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 1146, 8 U. S. C. § 1481
(1954).
State disabilities include: ineligibility for and loss of employment as a teacher,
with the state and mandatory registration. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 18, Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U. S. 422 (1956).
29 See note 2, supra.
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restricted the District Court to the performance of the judicial function of
directing a witness to testify if the court determined that his case fell within
the framework and requisites of the Act; the pertinent legislative history is,
at worst, inconclusive; 30 where ambiguous, that statutory construction which
avoids the constitutional question is preferred; 31 and the validity of iubsections (a) and (b), independently worded and inapplicable here, cannot
be questioned by petitioner. The Court did not question the conclusion that
if the statute did empower the District Court to review a grant of immunity
under the Act such would be an unconstitutional non-judicial function
whether deemed part of the executive power of pardon 32 or the legislative
power of amnesty 33 for crimes committed. It did, however, reject petitioner's premise and supporting evidence thereunder, to wit: his interpretation
of the statute's legal history; the fact that sub-sections (a) and (b) expressly delegate that function to the Court without any separability clause; and
the words of the Attomey-General3 4 and a leading scholar 35 in the immunity
field to that effect.
Because they were not raised when petitioner was cited for contempt,
the instant majority declined to consider petitioner's other points: 30 namely,
that the District Court order was invalid because it directed petitioner to
answer questions in violation of the First Amendment, not relevant to a
bona fide investigation into espionage; and it did not define the scope of
petitioner's area of immunity. The .petitioner's conviction was affirmed.
In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice
Black concurred, disputed the basic premises of the majority. Initially,
he believed, Brown v. Walker, 7 decided by a bare majority sixty years ago
and the constitutional foundation of immunity statutes, should be overruled.
The minority felt it "beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to
confess his crimes" 38 deeming the purpose of the privilege against selfincrimination to be "not only a protection against conviction and prosecution but a safeguard of conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as wel 9 . . . the Constitution places the right of silence beyond
the reach of government." 40 Great infamy, against which the self-incrimination privilege was purportedly designed to protect,41 was seen in the in30 See note 5, supra at 627.
31 United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 45, 73 S. Ct. 543, 547, 97 L. Ed. 770,
775 (1953).
32 U. S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, ci. 1.
33

Ex Parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1866).

Address by Attorney-General Brownell, Twentieth Century General Congress,
General Society of Mayflower Descendants, Sept. 13, 1954.
34

35 Dixon, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Federal Immunity Statutes,
23 GEO. WAsir. L. REv. 502 (1955).
36 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 55, 58, Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422 (1956).
37 See note 8, supra.
38 See note 1, supra at 445, 76 S. Ct. 497, 510, 100 L. Ed. 361 (dissenting opinion).
39 Ibid.
40 Id. at 454, 76 S. Ct. 497, 515, 100 L. Ed. 361.
41 See U. S. CoNsT. amend. V, cI. 1.
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stant case by the minority because the disclosure of Communist membership or affiliation practically excommunicates one from society. The dissent
further reasoned that the Immunity Act of 1954 violated the privilege against
self-incrimination for want of protection from the federal and state punitive disabilities42 that attach to one who is a Communist. Noting that Communist Party membership is a crucial evidentiary link in conviction under
the Smith Act, 43 it was reasoned that these disabilities were penalties affixed
to a criminal act. Such penalties have been held to be sufficient ground for
invoking the privilege against the compulsory production of a private invoice to be used in a proceeding by the United States for the forfeiture
of goods allegedly imported without payment of duties.4 4 Mr. Justice Douglas also contended there was nothing in the legislative history of this Immunity Act to indicate Congressional intent to include these disabilities
within its protection.
It appears that the problem over the use of the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment by witnesses in cases involving alleged communism is a product of conflicting legal principles. One entitles the United
States to the testimony of every citizen, especially in matters of national
security, while the other accords every witness the privilege not to accuse
himself. Federal immunity acts, which exchange amnesty for information,
are an attempted solution. They are not new,45 though mainly used previously by administrative agencies. Yet their validity and propriety are a
matter of debate. 46 Does the privilege against self-incrimination accord one
an absolute right of silence or is it "not of the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty"? 47 Are they justifiable despite moral compulsion and possible abuse by Congressional investigating committees? It was the latter's
"immunity baths" that caused repeal of the first immunity statute. 48 In
fact, it was not until the present Act that Congressional committees were
re-invested with the power to grant immunity from criminal prosecution in
national security cases. Its constitutionality remains to be tested. Yet, federal immunity statutes have been repeatedly sustained by the courts and
49
the instant Act has been termed a "fair balance" by an erudite jurist.
The decision at bar only validates that part of the Immunity Act of
1954 relating to the testimony of witnesses and production of evidence before federal grand juries. Its seed was planted in 1892 when the self-incrimi42 See note 28, supra.
43 Alien Registration Act, 1940, 54 STAT. 670, 18 U. S. C. § 2385 (1940), as
amended 62 STAT. 808 (1948).
44 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
45 See note 15, supra.
46 See GSiswoLD, THE Firm AmENDMENT TODAY 80-81 (Cambridge 1955);
TAYLOR GRAND INQUEST 217-21, 296-300

(New York 1955); BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY

INvEsTIGATiON 130-34 (New York 1955).
47 Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the majority, in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U. S. 319, 325-26, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292 (1937).
48 Act of January 24, 1862, 12 STAT. 333, 2 U. S. C. § 193 (1862).
49 HOESTADTER, THE Fi=m AENDMENT AND THE ImmuNIn'
AcT oF 1954, 10
Record 453 (1955).
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nation clause was initially extended to grand jury proceedings. 0 Following
the instant decision, petitioner exercised his right to purge himself of the
adjudged contempt by answering the grand jury's questions.Y The Immunity Act has since been successfully applied a second time.52 However, because of its controversial nature and the questions still remaining open, it
is likely-that sub-section (c) of the Immunity Act of 1954 will again come
before the Supreme Court.
60 Cdunselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110 (1892);
See also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906); Annot.,
38 A. L. R. 2d 225 (1951).
51 N. Y. Times, July 7, 1956, p. 7, col. 1.
52 United States v. Fitzgerald, 235 F. 2d 453 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. den., 352

U. S. 842, 77 S. Ct. 66, 1 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1956).

